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and Paul Brocklehurst6
Abstract
Background: In May 2009, the Northern Ireland government introduced General Dental Services (GDS) contracts
based on capitation in dental practices newly set up by a corporate dental provider to promote access to dental
care in populations that had previously struggled to secure service provision. Dental service provision forms an
important component of general health services for the population, but the implications of health system financing
on care delivered and the financial cost of services has received relatively little attention in the research literature.
The aim of this study is to evaluate the policy effect capitation payment in recently started corporate practices had
on the delivery of primary oral healthcare in Northern Ireland and access to services.
Methods: We analysed the policy initiative in Northern Ireland as a natural experiment to find the impact
on healthcare delivery of the newly set up corporate practices that use a prospective capitation system to
remunerate primary care dentists. Data was collected from GDS claim forms submitted to the Business Services
Organisation (BSO) between April 2011 and October 2014. Health and Social Care Board (HSCB) practices
operating within a capitation system were matched to a control group, who were remunerated using a
retrospective fee-for-service system.
Results: No evidence of patient selection was found in the HSCB practices set up by a corporate provider and
operated under capitation. However, patients were less likely to visit the dentist and received less treatment
when they did attend, compared to those belonging to the control group (P < 0.05). The extent of preventive
activity offered and the patient payment charge revenue did not differ between the two practice groups.
Conclusion: Although remunerating NHS primary care dentists in newly set up corporate practices using a
prospective capitation system managed costs within healthcare, there is evidence that this policy may have
reduced access to care of registered patients.
Background
Funding the delivery of oral health services in public
funded systems is complex and governments wrestle to
align financial incentives for health care professionals with
policy goals [1]. Economic theory suggests that the method
of remuneration influences provider behaviour and a large
body of evidence, principally in the field of medicine, sup-
ports this theory [2]. Dental service provision forms an
important component of general health services for the
population, but the implications of health system finan-
cing on care delivered and the financial cost of services
has received relatively little attention [3]. For example,
a 2013 Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of
Care systematic review examined the impact of differ-
ent methods of remuneration on the behaviour of
primary care dentists and found that the number of
available studies that met the eligibility criteria was lim-
ited and the quality of the evidence was poor [4].* Correspondence: Harry.hill@manchester.ac.uk
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Dental service provision in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom (UK) context, dental service
provision is provided by both the public and private
sectors. The private sector is financed by patient
charges and/or private insurance. Public dental services
are provided under the UK National Health Service
(NHS) financed by the Department of Health (via direct
taxation) and patient charge revenue. Children, adoles-
cents and exempt adults receive NHS dental treatment
free at the point of delivery. Dentists providing NHS
services receive Fee-For-Service (FFS) remuneration
related to the number and type of dental treatments
they provide to adult patients and in Northern Ireland
and Scotland a capitation payment for the number of
registered children with the practice and allowances
such as Continuing Professional Development allow-
ance, General Dental Practice allowance and reimburse-
ment of non-domestic rates.
Healthcare policy makers in the UK are experimenting
with alternative payment schemes. The Department of
Health in Northern Ireland is currently piloting a new
contract with payment by capitation for all activity as an
approach to contain costs, promote prevention rather
than treatment of disease and improve the quality of
care provided to patients [5]. The Department of Health
in England is prototyping a new contract with payment
by capitation for all activity after the FFS component of
the current dental contract came under widespread criti-
cism for providing incentives to dentists to deliver more
treatments rather than reducing service needs through
preventive care [6–10]. Other UK initiatives which al-
tered remuneration methods were specific to particular
patient groups (e.g. the change in the 1990s to treat chil-
dren wholly on a capitation basis in England).
The experiment service development initiative in
Northern Ireland
In May 2009, an initiative was set up to promote access
to NHS dental care in populations that had previously
struggled to secure Health and Social Care Board
(HSCB) service provision. This involved introducing new
dental practices in Northern Ireland. General Dental
Service (GDS) contracts for the new practices were capi-
tation based. Capitation remuneration systems reward
primary care dentists according to the number of pa-
tients registered to a practice, and hence dentists are
given an incentive to provide care to new patients and
consider the cost of treatment [4]. Oasis Dental Care
were among a number of practices that responded to a
tender to provide HSBC dental care in Northern Ireland
under capitation contracts and in April 2010, they were
awarded funding from the Department of Health, Social
Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) to provide 38 pri-
mary care dentists working in 14 new practices located
in regions where patient access to oral healthcare was
limited.
Contracts were awarded for a period of 3 years based
on a block contract payment of £5.7 m per year to (make
reasonable efforts to) register and maintain the dental
health of 57,000 patients by 1st August 2012 [11]. The
HSCB in Northern Ireland monitored monthly registra-
tions and held regular monitoring meetings with Oasis
Dental Care [11]. The Oasis practices did not achieve
this target level of registrations so in year 4, the contract
was changed so that for each patient they registered (up
to a maximum of 57,000) they received £94.74 per year
for looking after their dental health.
Methods
The aim of this study was to examine how patient out-
comes differed between the newly set up Oasis practices
paid by capitation, compared to a matched set of control
practices paid by traditional FFS payments, after control-
ling for other patient and practice characteristics. The
following research questions were addressed:
1. Do Oasis practices serve a different patient
population than control practices (patient selection)?
2. Are patients registered to Oasis practices less likely
to receive care than patients in control practices
(service coverage)?
3. Do patients who receive care in Oasis practices
differ from patients receiving care in control
practices in the types of services received
(type and mix of treatment received)?
4. Is the cost of delivering dental care to the HSCB
higher under capitation as a result of differences
in patient-charge revenue raised
(system financial viability)?
Data collection and matching approach
The data used in this study were based on claim forms
that primary care dentists are required to submit to the
HSCB as part of their contractual regulations. Although
Oasis practices were not remunerated for each treatment
item provided, they were still required to submit the
same documentation as primary care dental practices for
auditing purposes. There was no recruitment of humans
into the study. Consent was not required because all
data was at the dental practice level (no individual den-
tist or patient information was used) and the Business
Services Organisation (BSO) anonymised the practice
data before sending it to the research team for analysis.
We compared the 14 Oasis practices to a control
group of matched primary care dental practices paid by
FFS. Control practices were selected based on practice
location. Postcode data of all registered practices with
the HSCB for Northern Ireland was used to select the
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five nearest practices to each Oasis practice. Distance
(smallest) from an Oasis practice was chosen as the
matching approach as an attempt to control for the oral
health care needs of populations being served by the
practices. This provided a control group of 70 practices.
After screening the data, four of the seventy control
practices were removed from the sample because of in-
complete claims data. Practices with less than 1000
patients registered at the practice in any month were re-
moved from the sample because this could have indi-
cated a new practice not yet operating at a steady state
or that a practice was reducing registrations in advance
of practice closure. This resulted in removing one Oasis
practice and nine practices from the control group leav-
ing a study sample of 13 Oasis practices and 57 control
practices. 89% (51 of 57) of control practices were
matched to an Oasis practice in the same postcode
district.
The data from the claim forms were pooled over
43 months (April 2011 to October 2014). Seventy prac-
tices formed an unbalanced panel dataset of 2971
monthly practice claims (556 Oasis and 2415 control).
A full description of Oasis and control group practices
sample characteristics is found in Additional file 1.
The analysis covers the period from April 2011 until
October 2013, in order to ensure a sufficient number of
monthly observations for panel regression. The begin-
ning of the study period is nearly 2 years after the Oasis
contract was signed (May 2009) to accommodate the
different starting dates for the Oasis practices.
Variable description
The analysis is based on routinely collected BSO activ-
ity data on a range of study variables and potential
confounders. The outcome measures (or dependent
variables) are patient characteristics, incidence of care
amongst registered patients, type and mix of treatment
received, and patient charge revenue raised. The mea-
sures do not capture private dental healthcare delivered
during the study period. However, the HSCB regularly
monitored all healthcare activity delivered in Oasis
practices to ensure that the proportion of private
healthcare to HSCB treatments delivered to patients is
close to the average level found in all Northern Ireland
practices. The differences between Oasis practices and
control practices on these variables are analyzed in a
regression with control variables.
The study population was divided into sub-groups for
analysis of patient selection. The outcome measures (or
dependent variables) were the following patient charac-
teristics (1) the proportion of registered patients who are
60 years of age or older (2) the proportion of registered
patients who are 18 years of age or under (3) the propor-
tion of registered patients exempt from HSCB patient
charges between 18 and 60 years of age or under. The
payment charge exemption categories were: expectant or
nursing mothers, Income Support, Job Seekers Allow-
ance, Working Family Tax Credits, and certificates for
full or partial help with health care costs. These exemp-
tion categories were chosen to capture the proportion of
the registered population where there may be higher ex-
pected oral health need [12].
The service coverage examined was that received by
registered patients during a particular month and the
pattern and type of services received. The analysis shows
if the registered patient population Oasis practices see
the dentist less frequently, have fewer treatment courses
or receive less costly treatment than patients in control
practices. The outcome measures used to indicate ser-
vice coverage are the number of unique patients seen
(i.e. repeated visits from the same patient is not counted)
per 100 patient registrations, the number of treatment
courses per 100 registered patients and the monetary
value per treatment course. A single treatment course is
all the treatment items provided to a patient (including
check-up) that is recorded by the primary care dentist
on a payment claim form to the HSCB, so each treat-
ment course covers the completion of a treatment plan.
Treatments provided were categorized into different
types to compare the case mix profiles of Oasis and con-
trol practices. The outcome measures used to indicate
type and mix of treatment was the prevalence of particular
services (examinations, restorations (fillings), extractions,
and scale and polishes) per 100 unique patients seen. As a
measure of the prevalence of preventive care we use the
number of fluoride varnishes per 100 children registered
at the practice. Routine application of fluoride varnish is
recommended for children from the age of two in the
NHS in England [13].
System financial viability was assessed from patient
charge revenue records the primary care dentists submit
to the NHS on their payment claim forms. The outcome
measures used to indicate system financial viability were
the mean patient charge revenue per registered patient
and mean patient charge revenue per treatment course.
The label financial viability is given to these variables be-
cause Oasis practices might generate less charge revenue
even after controlling for quantity of work performed.
This is because Oasis might deliver a different mix of
services to a different mix of patients. As the patient
charge revenue differs by type of service (preventive v
treatment and treatment type) delivered and type of pa-
tient (exempt v non exempt), the mean charge revenue
per service delivered may differ between Oasis and
matched practices. On our financial sustainability mea-
sures, reductions in patient charge revenue associated
with the frequency and content of services delivered by
Oasis practices under capitation would increase the net
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cost of dental care to the HSCB, so is an important con-
sideration for commissioners of dental healthcare consid-
ering a change in the method of remunerating dentists.
The explanatory variables used in the analysis to con-
trol for patient need were the proportion of adult regis-
tered patients to registered children, the proportion of
exempt patients and the index of multiple deprivation
(IMD) score for the practice location. The capacity of
the practice to meet needs was measured by the number
of dentists working at the practice.
Analysis
To address the research questions the mean difference
between Oasis and control group practices was esti-
mated after controlling for other explanatory variables
using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model
with robust standard errors. OLS is applied to panel data
in long panel form (data on n practices, over t time
monthly periods, for a total of n × t observations), with a
number of monthly observations for each practice.
These repeated observations of an individual practice
cause clustering and standard errors to fall as the num-
ber of repeated monthly observations increases. These
standard errors at practice level were adjusted (robust
standard errors) to control for this in a pooled OLS re-
gression. The estimates from the OLS models are pre-
sented as associations as there is the possibility that
unobservable influences that mediate the relationship
between the explanatory variables and the outcome
measures invalidate any conclusions of causality. Panel
models were considered as a way of accounting for
unobservable influences, but rejected after coefficient
testing. Details of the panel estimation approaches
undertaken, tests used to compare the modeling ap-
proaches and results with different panel estimators are
provided in Additional file 1. The specification of the
OLS is defined as
yi ¼ β0 þ β1Ii þ β2xi þ i
For practice i, yi is an outcome measure, I is a inter-
vention/policy treatment variable measuring whether it
is part of the Oasis group or control group, xi are a set
of practice and patient covariates and ϵi is an error term.
The statistical significance and direction of the estimated
intervention coefficient indicates if there is a difference
between Oasis practices and the control group after con-
trolling for differences in xi, practice and patient charac-
teristics that were (a) related to the outcome measure
but (b) unrelated to whether a practice operates on the
Oasis contract. In the patient selection model, the ex-
planatory variables measuring patient-mix (age 60 and
above, children and patient need) were not included be-
cause they were not independent of the dependent
variable (the proportions of registered patients in particu-
lar age groups and in particular exemption categories).
The Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error
Test (RESET) was used to test for model mis-specification
i.e. whether there was a statistically significant improve-
ment in fit with non-linear combinations of explanatory
variables.
Data analysis used Stata software version 11.1. A p <
0.05 was used as the threshold for statistical significance
and highlighted in the results tables.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 describes practice characteristics and patient se-
lection variables for Oasis and control practices. Oasis
practices had greater staffing capacity to deliver service
provision compared to the control practices, with an
average of 0.89 more dentists active per practice per
month. The mean number of monthly treatment items
delivered was larger among control practices (922 treat-
ments items) than among Oasis practices (811 treat-
ment items). The mean monthly number of treatment
courses delivered to patients was larger for an Oasis
practice (463 treatment courses) than a control practice
(392 treatment courses) while the mean monetary value
of the treatment plans delivered was lower in Oasis
practices than in control practices by £10.83. These dif-
ferences between the two groups were statistically sig-
nificant at a 5% level.
Results from the economic model
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 2. Each
row in the table is a separate regression; with a different
dependent variable related to a particular research ques-
tion. Estimated coefficients on the intervention variables
indicate the difference in the outcome variable between
Oasis practices and control practices when the values of
other explanatory variables in the equations are held
constant. The table shows the intervention variable esti-
mate without the use of control variables, and with prac-
tice and case-mix control variables. The latter is the
main model specification. P values of the intervention
variable, r2, the number of practices (n), the number of
practice month observations (N) are presented for each
regression.
The findings in Table 2 were robust to model specifi-
cation. The RESET test was performed for each outcome
measure. In each case the p value of the test was greater
than 0.05 indicating that the null hypothesis (that the
model is not mis-specified) should not rejected. In
addition, there is little difference in the magnitude and
statistical significance of the intervention variable when
it is estimated by random effects panel model or panel
model a Mundlak correction (see Additional file 1).
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Patient selection
There is no evidence of differences in patient mix be-
tween Oasis and control practices based on patient need.
The proportion of registered patients from payment
charge exempt groups with higher expected healthcare
need was not significantly different between the two
practice types. There was mixed evidence of patient se-
lection based on age. Oasis practices had on average 11
fewer children per 100 registrations than control prac-
tices (P < 0.00), although there was no statistically
significant difference in the number of older (age 60+)
registrants per 100 practice registrants.
Receipt of care among registrants
An Oasis practice saw on average 1.6 fewer unique pa-
tients per 100 patient registrations per month than a
control group practice (P < 0.00). The average value per
treatment course was £14.00 lower in an Oasis practice
than in a control practice (P < 0.00). This suggests that
within the given time period, Oasis practices saw a
Table 1 Sample differences between Oasis practices and control practices
Variable Mean values for
Oasis practices
Mean values for
control practices
Difference in
mean values
P value of diff.
Practice characteristics
Number of dentists 4.11 3.21 0.89 P<0.01
Regional deprivation (IMD) 19.8 21.2 −1.41 P<0.01
Monthly number of treatment items 811 922 −110 P<0.01
Monthly number of treatment courses 463 392 71 P<0.01
Monthly number of registrations 3850 3359 490 P<0.01
Monthly number of patients seen 320 306 14.4 0.15
Case-mix
% of registered patients age 60 and above 13.3 15.3 −2.01 P<0.01
% of child registered patients 19.9 30.7 −10.7 P<0.01
% of registered patients exempt from payment charges 36.7 43.2 −6.6 P<0.01
All italicized P values are statistically significant at a 1% level
Table 2 Series of regression models to show findings for each research question
Dependent variable Intervention variable estimate Estimate with control variables n, N, r2
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Patient selection
% of registered patients age 60 and above −2.01 0.10 - - 70, 2557, 0.04
% of registered patient that are children −10.74 P<0.01 - - 70, 2557, 0.19
% of registered patients exempt from payment charges
for reasons associated with high dental care need
−6.55 0.05 - - 70, 2557, 0.14
Receipt of care among registrants
Patients seen per 100 registrations −0.54 0.07 −1.61 P<0.01 70, 2557, 0.11
Treatment courses per 100 registrations 0.78 0.01 0.44 0.33 70, 2557, 0.01
Value of treatment per treatment course −10.83 P<0.01 −14.00 P<0.01 70, 2557, 0.29
Mix of treatments
Examination per 100 patients seen −4.30 0.02 −9.7 P<0.01 70, 2557, 0.05
Extractions per 100 patients seen 4.62 P<0.01 6.31 P<0.01 70, 2557, 0.18
Fillings per 100 patients seen −15.97 P<0.01 −17.12 P<0.01 70, 2557, 0.22
Scale and polish per 100 patients seen −8.13 0.01 −11.5 P<0.01 70, 2557, 0.07
Fluoride varnish per 100 patients seen −0.01 0.80 0.03 0.41 70, 2557, 0.19
Fluoride varnish per 100 child registrations −0.001 0.91 0.008 0.33 70, 2557, 0.06
Financial viability
Patient payment charge revenue per registration 3.93 P<0.01 −0.68 0.63 70, 2557, 77
Patient payment charge revenue per treatment course 1.37 0.17 −2.91 P<0.01 70, 2989, 0.80
Hill et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:175 Page 5 of 10
smaller proportion of their registered patients and pro-
vided courses of a lower monetary value compared to
control practices. There was no statistically significant
difference between the practice groups in the average
number of monthly treatment courses provided per reg-
istered patient, which suggests that there was no evi-
dence of Oasis practices ‘underserving’ registered
patients in the absence of any service volume remuner-
ation incentives.
Mix of treatments
There was evidence of a difference in treatment pre-
scribing patterns between the two practice groups. An
Oasis practice provided an average of 9.7 fewer examina-
tions, 17.2 fewer fillings and 11.5 fewer scale and polish
services per 100 unique patients seen per month than
control practices (p < 0.00). However, they provided an
average of 6.3 more extractions per 100 unique patients
per month (p < 0.00). The volume of fluoride varnish ap-
plications per patient seen and per 100 child registra-
tions was not significantly different between practice
groups.
Financial viability
In terms of the financial implications of funding care
under capitation (the Oasis contract), Oasis practices re-
ceived an average of £2.91 less patient charge revenue
per treatment course than control practices (P < 0.00)
because of the higher proportion of adult patients ex-
empt from charges. However, this was mitigated by the
lower proportion of children in Oasis practices, meaning
a greater proportion of the treatment plans delivered by
Oasis practices were subject to patient charge payments.
Once we adjust for these ‘offsetting’ patient-mix factors,
it resulted in no significant difference in the mean
monthly payment charge revenue per registered patient
between Oasis and control practices.
Discussion
There was no difference in patient payment charge rev-
enue and the extent of preventive activity offered be-
tween Oasis practices under a capitation system and
nearby practices on FFS. This is in contrast to findings
from other studies, where financial incentives in the
remuneration system impacted the amount of clinical
activity provided to patients in the NHS [4, 9, 14].
There is evidence of large and abrupt changes in the
provision of many types of treatments (Bridge work,
crowns, extractions, fillings, root fillings, radiographs)
with the change to a new incentive structure in England
and Wales in 2006 [4]. Another UK study found that
after adjustment for baseline differences, sealant treat-
ment was 9.8% higher when remuneration was by a fee
[6]. A major consideration when evaluating the policy
of expanding dental healthcare by funding a corporate
provider to set up new practices and remunerate those
practices by capitation is whether they attract and/or
serve populations with different needs to the control
practices. Our analysis found no evidence of patient se-
lection (‘or cherry picking’) associated with different
patient age groups with broadly differing oral health
care needs among Oasis practices.
Oasis practices were purposely set up in locations
where the government had identified barriers which pre-
vented access to oral healthcare in the resident popula-
tion. The policy aim of the pilots was to improve access
in these areas and Oasis practices largely met the target
number of 57,000 registered patients set by the govern-
ment. However, registered patients were also found to
be less likely to visit a primary care dentist compared to
patients in neighbouring control group practices (1.6
fewer unique patients per 100 patient registrations per
month) and received less treatment when they did at-
tend (the average value per treatment course was £14.00
lower). These are similar to findings in other studies that
have investigated dental practice remuneration methods.
A US study found an average of 9.41 treatment items for
dentists under FFS patients compared to 3.69 for those
under capitation [15], another study found the average
cost of a treatment course under capitation was $131.76
compared to $169.90 with FFS [16] and the mean num-
ber of visits per 0 to 15 year olds has been found to be
lower in regional areas where dentists were under capi-
tation contract compared to FFS contract areas [17].
Our findings suggests either less over-provision under
capitation in Oasis practices or more under-provision,
although it is important to note that over 300 Oasis pa-
tients were examined by independent dentists to check
care quality and to look for under/over provision. They
found the care was comparable to the GDS and there
was no systematic under or over provision. Instead the
findings of fewer visits and less treatment in a treatment
course might be the result of unobserved heterogeneity
between practices. For example, Oasis practices were set
up where populations were unable to get access to a
NHS dentist and so it may be that some individuals in
the Oasis practice population had their care needs met
by the private sector. If this were the case, differences in
service coverage would not be caused by the different
ways the dentists were remunerated or different practice
structures (the characteristics of the dentists, manage-
ment and organization of practice staff ).
Ideally, an evaluation of the pilot contract would in-
corporate considerations of the quality of products and
services in terms of impact on patient outcomes (e.g.
oral health and satisfaction with care). The absence of
these measures means that our study findings should be
interpreted with caution. The lower number of unique
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patients seen by Oasis practices (per 100 patient regis-
trations) may be a reflection of higher-quality care that
produces better patient outcomes by, for example, taking
more time with each patient seen. However it may also
reflect lower patient satisfaction with the quality of care
delivered, causing fewer patients to visit the practice.
Further exploration of this line of enquiry would require
data on quality of care.
We try to control for major components of geograph-
ical heterogeneity between Oasis and FFS practices. The
model included explanatory variables that captured the
age mix of the practice population, the prevalence of ex-
emption from dental payment charges for reasons of
higher risks of oral health problems and the level of
deprivation in the local community. The later variable is
of limited use for capturing the socioeconomic
deprivation of patients because patients can choose to
attend a practice from any geographic region. We try to
overcome this problem by using the outward code of
practice postcode districts for the regional deprivation
indicator. The outward code covers regions the size of a
town so it may be that few patients travel to a practice
in another postcode region (and hence deprivation area)
particularly because Oasis practices were located in areas
with fewer providers (the purpose of the policy was to
increase availability of care in areas of poor dental ser-
vice access). Our analyses of practice level data could
still be biased if the populations of practices differ sig-
nificantly in other relevant factors than the ones con-
trolled for. Hence, we chose a method of matching to
reduce the likelihood that differences in the practice
level measures have arisen by the nature of patients by
having patients drawn from the same locality. These
methods reduce but may not remove all between-
practice variations in patient populations.
Causality is not established by the modelling approach
although the service coverage findings were consistent
with dentists working under capitation; seeing patients
less frequently and ‘doing less’ to patients when they do
see them. Similar findings were reported in other stud-
ies. A US study found that capitation practices provided
less-expensive services [15], an average of 3.62 crown
and bridge services were planned for adult FFS patients
compared to 0.42 by capitation, and studies from the
UK, Sweden, Denmark and Norway found that dentists
with per capita remuneration ‘under-treated’ patients
[17–20].
Capitation introduces an incentive for clinicians to
choose treatment options that require less time [21]. In
terms of the type and mix of services delivered, the
higher prevalence of extractions in Oasis practice (6.3
more extractions per 100 unique patients per month)
could be because extractions take less time than treat-
ment alternatives (for example, root canal treatments).
The lower prevalence of examinations and fillings
among Oasis practices (9.7 fewer examinations and 17.2
fewer fillings per 100 unique patients seen per month)
suggests that patients registered with these practices
were not seen as often and had longer recall periods.
Although this might reduce the prevalence of unneces-
sary interventions among patients, equally it may also
lead to some oral health problems being missed and
interventions being delayed. These findings are in con-
trast to those found in Sweden where capitation was
found to increase the number of examinations [22] and
in Norway, where the finding of no under-diagnosis of
carious lesions under capitation suggests health prob-
lems were not missed [19]. However, the majority of
studies find results similar to that in the Oasis group
with the number of restorative services being less under
capitation [23–25].
Capitation introduces an incentive for clinicians to
meet health need through preventive care rather than
more treatment [9]. We found no evidence of this in the
Oasis practices, which were as likely to use preventive
treatments on patient population than the control group.
This finding should be interpreted with caution because
preventive care was measured with treatments that
could have been desirable to patients for reasons other
than extent of prevention offered. For example, “scaling
and polishing” aims at removing calculus and plaque
that can cause oral health problems (periodontal disease)
in the future although it is a procedure that many pa-
tients like, due to its aesthetic value (removal of stained
deposits). For this reason, the application of fluoride var-
nish is potentially a better marker of prevention orienta-
tion. However, its provision may be influenced by the
absence of FFS for fluoride varnish whereas there is a
fee for fissure sealants (the fluoride varnish application
is covered by the capitation payment as the patient
group is children). The few studies that investigate the
effect of capitation payment in dentistry on service-mix
in the UK focus on a pilot contract that lasted from
1984 to 1989 and a capitation scheme for child patients
from 1990 [23, 25–29]. They find more preventive pro-
cedures carried out by dentists with per capita remuner-
ation than by dentists with FFS. One of these studies
specifically aimed to investigate the levels of restorative
care in three England regions where dentists under FFS
remuneration changed to capitation, they found 5 years
later that the prevalence of preventive care treatment
(fissure sealants) increase from 16 to 30%, 13 to 50% and
25 to 47% respectively [29]. This in in contrast to what
was found in Oasis practices although the difference in
results may be explained by Oasis practices receiving
capitation remuneration for adult and child patients
while the previous studies examined a capitation scheme
for children only. In addition, the difference in results
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may be because the Oasis practices were recently started
by a corporate provider while the practices examined in
previous studies are likely to have been under ownership
from a individual or partner group of dentists and have
been operational for a range of periods before the evalu-
ation of their performance took place. Although Oasis
practices were recently started, the study period started
around 2 years after the Oasis contract was signed. In
this time newly registered patients received treatment.
Hence, by the time the study commenced these patients’
will have had 2 years exposure to services with accumu-
lated needs for treatment having already been addressed,
at least in part, prior to the period of data analysis.
Finally, there is evidence that remuneration by capi-
tation in recently started corporate practices is as
financially viable to NHS commissioners of healthcare
as current services. This is because there was no dif-
ference in practice revenues transferred to HSCB com-
missioners (accrued in practices from treatment fees
charged to patients) per unit of service coverage (registra-
tions) and per unit of healthcare delivered (treatment
plans). The patient payment charge revenue per registered
patient did not differ between Oasis practices and those
that operated on a FFS basis. However, Oasis practices
had a smaller percentage of children (who are exempt
from NHS patient charges) compared to control practices
by a mean difference of 10.7%, which would offset the re-
duced revenue per patient income and may explain the
non-significant finding in overall patient payment charge
income. In the literature, only one study specifically aimed
to investigate the financial impactions of a capitation
scheme and it found a net positive economic outcome
over 3 years for a pilot contract in a Swedish dental clinic
[22].
The main limitation of the study concerned the limited
amount of information available on the practices and the
populations served by the practices, as well as the non-
random nature of allocating the provider payment
methods and allocation of patients. Receipt of oral
healthcare is conditional on registration therefore the
models used in this study were conditional on registra-
tions and hence subject to selection bias. One approach
to correct for sample selection is the Heckman model
[30]. This incorporates the probability of registration
within the population, but as this study is confined to
practice populations, such methods cannot be used.
Instead an OLS regression model with robust standard
errors was used. As highlighted above, the study was de-
signed to minimise the impact of patient and practice
heterogeneity between Oasis and control practices. As a
result, a ‘difference in difference’ design could not be
used (there was no ‘before intervention’ period for the
Oasis practices) [31]. Although we were able to identify
statistically significant differences in some aspects of
patient populations, receipt of care amongst registrants,
service mix and patient payment charge revenue, data
was not available on patient outcomes. As such, it is not
possible to determine whether the lower prevalence of
interventions in the Oasis practices, was the result of in-
appropriate supplier induced demand among control
practices (unnecessary interventions) or the failure to
intervene in a timely way among Oasis practices (super-
vised neglect) or both.
In addition to the selection bias of patients, another
study limitation was the possible selection bias in the al-
location of practices to receive the capitation contract.
This was non-random, and the Oasis practices could be
expected to operate under a different management sys-
tem. This is because the intervention practices were
owned by a single private limited company responsible
for over 300 dental practices in the UK while the control
group practices were owned by single dentist or a small
team of owner dentists and/or partners. This makes it
difficult to separate the effect of financial incentives
from the effect of ownership model and management
culture. The practices were in areas where access to
HSCB dentistry was problematic, which was the reason
why the Department introduced the capitation scheme.
Hence, the findings may not be generalisable to areas
already well served with practices providing HSCB den-
tal care. Another limitation is that it was not possible to
discern whether our findings are caused by differences
between Oasis practices and controls in practice struc-
tures (characteristics of dentists, method of remuner-
ation). In addition, aggregate differences between Oasis
practices and controls may have been caused by changes
in the behavior of dentists in Oasis practices in response
to their awareness of being monitored by the DHSSPS
(the ‘Hawthorn effect’). This is because the DHSSPS
were required to check if Oasis practices had met a
contracted minimum number of patient registrations,
dentist working hours and proportion of HSCB health-
care to private sector care delivered to patients.
Conclusion
This study explored the impact of policy that set up
practices with different systems of managing NHS den-
tist’s remuneration in Northern Ireland by analyzing the
policy intervention as a natural experiment. There is evi-
dence the payment charge revenues the NHS received
from capitation in recently started corporate provider
practices was not different from the payment charge rev-
enues the NHS received from FFS providers, suggesting
the policy was financially viable to the commissioners of
dental healthcare. There is some evidence of change to
the organisation of the healthcare output in dental prac-
tices. The pilot practices examined fewer patients and
undertook fewer restorations. The pilot practices under
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capitation remuneration did not have higher levels of pre-
vention, but did for the proportion extractions under-
taken. These results must be interpreted with caution as
the implications of these differences for patient outcomes
are not clear. Rather than using observational data, a de-
finitive randomised controlled trial would be required to
understand whether differences in the remuneration sys-
tem was causally related to patient outcomes.
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